I. Introduction
The earth's remaining wild tiger (Panthera tigris) populations continue to shrink and fragment under ever increasing human-related pressures. Over time, human activities have reduced tiger habitats by more than 90 per cent. Moreover, tigers live in only a small fraction of the potential habitat. Recent studies estimate that wild tigers inhabit less than 5 per cent of the 1.5 million km 2 of forest habitat available (Karanth, 2001) . The most widely cited published census suggests that between 4,000 -7,700 tigers may live in the wild (Jackson, 1993) . Estimating tiger populations is exceedingly difficult, hence these figures are generally considered to be unreliable and overly optimistic (Karanth, 1987; Jackson, 1993) . At present, more tigers may exist in captivity than in the wild (IUCN, 2001 ).
The evidence to date indicates that wild tiger populations continue declining despite substantial conservation efforts by international agencies, local conservation groups and governments, (Seidensticker et al, 1999) . The IUCN identifies tigers in all the range countries as endangered and the signatories to CITES have placed a ban on all international trade in live tigers and tiger parts.
Tigers need extensive areas to hunt and breed thus protecting wild populations and sustaining their habitats present wildlife managers with a set of complex and daunting tasks. For instance, tigers are large-bodied, obligate carnivores and readily come into conflict with humans by killing livestock and occasionally people. Population numbers are sensitive to the depletion of a prey base which often competes with domestic livestock for the same food sources. The role tigers play as a top predator is vital to regulating and perpetuating ecological processes and systems (Terborgh, 1999 , Sunquist et al 1999 . If either predator or prey numbers decline, entire ecological communities may become unstable with more and more species being gradually lost.
A further difficulty for conservation efforts is that wild tigers occur only in Asia, where the high incidence of rural poverty, large numbers of livestock and high levels of human population density and growth, speed forest degradation. Unlike much of Africa and Latin America, the vast majority of forests in Asia have already been converted to other land uses. In countries like India, forest boundaries appear to have stabilized and the major conservation management problem is most often related to how communities use forest resources within national parks, protected areas and public forests (Wells, 1992 , Ghimire, 1994 Nepal and Weber, 1995, Studsrod and Wegge, 1995; Gunatilake, 1998; Gunatilake and Chakravorty, 2000; Kumar, et al, 2000 , Lele, 2000 .
The proximate causes for the persistent decline of wild tiger populations are many.
Pressures vary regionally and change over time. Among the numerous forces threatening the tiger's survival include poaching, prey depletion and habitat fragmentation due to land clearing, livestock grazing, weed infestations, fuelwood and fodder extraction, smuggling for the illegal timber trade, and intrusive infrastructure (World Bank, 1996; Siedensticker et al, 1999) . What the relative contributions of these forces are to declining tiger populations and how they interact are less well understood (Karanth and Stith, 1999) .
Tiger poaching is considered to be the most imminent threat to survival of the species in the short run. In the early 1990s, wildlife authorities observed a dramatic escalation in the scale of poaching with tigers being killed to satisfy the burgeoning demand for tiger bones and organs for traditional Oriental medicine (Meacham, 1997) .
The biological consequences of declining tiger populations through poaching and prey depletion have been examined in careful detail (Karanth and Stith, 1999; Kenney et al, 1995) . However, no formal analysis has examined the fundamental economic causes driving wild tigers to extinction. This paper argues that a clearer understanding of how biological factors interact with economic forces is crucial for guiding policy choices aimed at sustaining viable habitats and reversing the decline in wild tiger populations.
The work presented here represents a first attempt to integrate economic incentives into a predator-prey model of tiger biology.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief description of the background to the problem. Section III outlines the basic model which describes the behaviour of subsistence farmers and poachers and their interaction with tigers and their prey. Section IV presents a stage based demographic model of tiger population growth dynamics. Section V outlines the simulation results of various alternative scenarios, while Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Background to the Problem
The tiger once had the widest geographical distribution of any big cat, stretching across Asia from Java, through India, to Siberia and eastern Turkey (Siedensticker et al, 1999) .
Hunting and habitat erosion have exterminated tigers through much of their previous range. Most habitats are now completely isolated from each other and contain less than 30 animals (Siedensticker et al, 1999) . Tigers feed predominately on large ungulates (hoofed mammals such as deer and wild cattle), occasionally capturing smaller prey.
They cannot survive if a habitat does not support sufficient densities of large ungulates.
To meet its nutritional needs, a tiger must feed on a large ungulate approximately once every eight to ten days. Field studies suggest that an adult tiger requires a minimum of 3,000 kg of meat per annum to survive (Schaller, 1967) . A breeding tigress may need twice that amount. Like other big cats, tigers succeed in capturing only 10 to 20 per cent of the available prey, suggesting that approximately 500 ungulates are required to support one tiger in the wild (Karanth, 1998) .
Tigers are also solitary animals, requiring vast forest areas of reasonable quality in which to roam, hunt and breed. Conserving wild populations therefore requires protecting the quality of their habitat as well as their prey. Factors influencing tiger densities vary in different regions. In relatively prey-rich forests such as India's Nagarahol, Kanha and Bandhavgar National Parks, densities can exceed 10 tigers per 100 km 2 (Karanth and Nichols, 2000) . In contrast, tiger densities in Siberia are considerably lower, since prey is less abundant and more widely dispersed. The central message emerging from the biological studies is that where habitats are undisturbed and prey is plentiful, tigers survive and may even endure limited poaching pressures.
The forests that tigers inhabit, however, provide a wide range of economic, social and environmental benefits. These benefits contribute greatly to human welfare, but they are valued differently by different people and different groups. Local, national and international interests in tigers and their habitats also differ greatly across landscapes. To government policymakers, tiger habitats are often seen only for their ability to generate income, employment, revenue and foreign exchange when converted to agriculture, timber, mines or other development-oriented activities including irrigation projects. To a small proportion of the humans living in and around the forests, tiger body parts yield substantially greater income than do live tigers roaming free. To many of the small scale agricultural producers, tigers and their prey are viewed as pests.
Numerous studies document both the crop damage caused by large, grazing ungulates (Sekhar, 1988; Karanth, 1991 , World Bank, 1996 . On the other hand, little information is available about two of the most imminent threats to the survival of wild tigers: the poaching of tigers and the poaching of their prey. Recent investigations suggest that the trade in tiger parts is controlled by criminal cartels, involved in a host of other illegal activities. In contrast, tiger poaching is undertaken by locals who have an intimate knowledge of the forests. Poachers are often paid a meager $15-20 for a tiger body, while the traders may secure in excess of $20,000 for an adult male tiger body (Nowell, 2000; WPSI, 2001) .
National governments tend to influence control over the choice of forest benefits. When traditional rights and access shift in ways that adversely impact local communities, households may have little incentive to use natural resources, and in particular protect animals, in a sustainable way (Barbier, 1992; Panayotou, 1993; Gunatilake, 1994 Gunatilake, , 1998 Tisdell, 1995; Shyamsundar and Kramer, 1996, World Bank, 1996) . For this reason, providing greater access and use of tiger habitats is often argued as the appropriate response to meet conservation objectives (Saberwal, 1993; Kothari et al, 1995) .
India has had a relatively successful history of tiger protection and is thought to possess the largest number of wild tigers of any of the range states (IUCN, 2001) . Its response to declining tiger populations has focused on establishing reserves.
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Although the most appropriate policy measures needed to halt or reverse declining tiger populations on these reserves are still contested, the overall management approach has recently shifted towards a participatory style known as Joint Forestry Management (JFM). Through sharing products, responsibilities, and decision making authority, JFM approaches seek to provide local communities with incentives to protect the forest resources that provide the bases of their income and future welfare.
While some argue that JFM should also be extended to wildlife protected areas (Kothari et al, 1995) , other studies raise important concerns about the appropriateness of JFMstyle conservation and protection efforts (Gunatilake, 1998) . For instance, Arcese (1995, 1998) question the assumptions linking local communities and sustainable forest resource use across diverse geographic conditions and economic situations. Simpson (1995) suggests the need for greater experimentation with direct-payment for conservation efforts, rather than funding untested participatory projects based on raising the value of forest products in ways that may fail to deliver improved conservation outcomes. This view finds support in Gunatilake's (1998) analysis of Sri Lanka which provides evidence that policies aimed at reducing dependency on forest based resources can be a much more effective way to protect forests than policies aimed at using forest resources. Examples include increasing non-farm and non-forestry employment, improving access to education, and enhancing agricultural productivity.
The model and simulations presented here examine how the tiger's biological needs interact with economics incentives facing households living in and around these habitats.
The analysis aims to contribute to the policy debate about how best to protect tiger populations.
III. The Model
1 The programme to protect tigers termed Project Tiger was introduced in 1973.
Most of India's tiger habitats are in parks and protected areas that also support various forms of land uses, including agriculture, livestock grazing and fuelwood collection (Mishra, 1997; Sekhar, 1998) . The interspersion of humans in and around these parks leads inevitably to conflicts over resource use (Schultz and Skonhoft, 1996) . Accordingly, we consider two motives for hunting prey species. The first is when the large ungulates cause damage to crops in adjoining agricultural areas, termed the 'nuisance effect' by Marks (1984) . The second motive arises from the incentive of subsistence producers to hunt ungulates as a supplementary food source. In contrast, tiger poaching is carried out under open access conditions and the incentive to hunt tigers is driven entirely by the demand for tiger products.
The context for this model is a wild tiger population in an insular forest patch surrounded by agricultural land --a typical characteristic of tiger reserves on the Indian subcontinent.
We extend the most recent model of tiger population dynamics developed by Karanth and Stith (1999) , to include predator-prey interactions. To isolate the economic causes of prey depletion from those of tiger poaching, the model distinguishes between two types of agents: subsistence farmers who hunt tiger prey and individuals who poach tigers 2 . We begin by describing the activities of tiger poachers.
The Tiger Poacher's Problem:
As noted earlier, organised crime cartels control the trade in tiger parts while local individuals poach tigers. There are assumed to be a large number of such potential poachers, hence poaching is treated as an open access activity. The payoff function to the representative poacher is given by:
where s is the poacher's remuneration for each tiger killed, θ p is the probability of a tiger poacher being apprehended and convicted, Ω p is the penalty for poaching a tiger, H T is the harvest of tigers, L p is the effort expended on poaching and w p is the cost per unit of effort.
Since data on the nature of tiger poaching is limited, any functional form that is adopted is necessarily conjectural. Existing evidence suggests that tigers are usually killed by poisoning, shooting, or setting traps and snares (WPSI, 2001) , techniques requiring only minimal investment in capital equipment. To economize on parameters, we abstract from the need for capital equipment and assume that the harvest rate depends on the density of tigers and the amount of search effort.
3 Accordingly, the poaching production function is specified as:
where T is the total number of tigers in the reserve, L p is search effort and R is the area of the reserve. The method by which the parameters β and λ are estimated is described in the Data Appendix.
Under conditions of open access, poachers will continue harvesting tigers until the payoffs from poaching fall to zero. Thus, substituting (1b) into (1a) and solving yields total poaching effort:
Using (1b) the harvest of tigers is given by:
3 Unlike many other species, tigers are highly secretive animals inhabiting dense forests, which often provide near perfect camouflage. The main poaching constraint is likely to be the difficulty involved in finding a tiger. Field studies suggest that the likelihood of an encounter depends on, inter alia the density of tigers and the amount of search effort (Karanth and Nicols; .These key features are captured in equation (1b).
Subsistence Farmers
As noted earlier, it is supposed that the reserve is surrounded by agricultural land. The production and consumption units are households engaged in three kinds of activities:
agricultural production, off-farm work and hunting tiger prey. Income from agricultural production and off-farm work is used to purchase food and other commodities.
Households hunt prey animals as a supplementary source of food and to protect crops from damage.
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Since very little is known about the nature of poaching, we adopt functional forms with parsimonious data requirements. There are assumed to be N households in the area surrounding the tiger reserve. A Cobb-Douglas function is employed to represent household utility:
where: F represents consumption of food, Z consumption of non-food items, h x consumption of prey animals, α i > 0 (i = F, Z, h) are the parameters of the utility function, with α F + α Z + α H = 1.
Equation (2a) is maximised subject to the constraints:
where G is agricultural output, X is the biomass of prey animals, L g , is labour time devoted to agriculture, L o is labour time devoted to off-farm work, L h is labour time spent hunting prey animals, θ s is the probability of being convicted for poaching and Ω s is the fine per unit harvest if convicted for poaching. k, b, δ, µ > 0 are parameters.
By equation (2a) household utility depends on the consumption of food (F), other goods (a non-food composite commodity (Z)) and the quantity of prey animals consumed (h x ).
Equation (2b) is the household budget constraint. Food and other goods are purchased at given prices p z and p F respectively. These purchases are financed by: (i) the sale of agricultural produce (G) which is sold at a price p g and (ii) off farm labour (L o ) which is remunerated at a wage rate of w (equation (2b)). Finally, since poaching is illegal, the household may incur an expected penalty θ s Ω s h x ; where θ s is the probability of detection and conviction, Ω s is the fine per prey animal poached.
Equation (2c) describes the agricultural production function. Following empirical studies on subsistence farming in India, agricultural production (G) is assumed to depend upon labour inputs (L g ), where b is the elasticity and k a constant (Deninger and Biswanger, 1998, Saha, 1994) . The production function also takes into account the damage to crops by grazing and trampling wild prey. This is given by µX, where X is the biomass of prey animals and µ is the damage coefficient.
Equation (2d) describes the prey harvest production function. In the absence of data on poaching of ungulate-prey in tiger habitats, we adopt a functional form that has been used in African studies of ungulate hunting (Bulte and van Kooten, 2000) . Thus, the harvest of herbivores (h x ) is a function of labour inputs (L h ) and the population of ungulate prey (X), with unit elasticities with respect to labour inputs and prey populations.
Equation (2e) is the time allocation constraint which requires that labour time devoted to off-farm work (L o ), agriculture (L g ), and hunting (L H ) must equal the fixed endowment of time (L) available to the household. Leisure is not included as a choice variable as household survey data in potential tiger habitats in Nepal suggest that opportunities for consumption of leisure are limited in such poor rural households (Bluffstone, 1995; Cooke, 1998) . 5 5 Note also that since the analysis focuses on subsistence households with limited incomes, we ignore the possibility that households may hire labour. In the absence of adequate data, we also ignore several components of agricultural household behaviour including: production and use of livestock (which may be preyed upon by tigers); different types of farm output; consumption of part of the farm output and the use of other non-labour inputs (eg. fertilizers).
The utility maximisation problem is based on the notion that households take the time path of exogenous variables, such as the stock of herbivores (X), as given. This reflects the fact that there are assumed to be many such households who have no property rights in wild animals. Hence, they have little incentive to take account of the future consequences of their current actions. Formally, this implies that households solve a static optimisation problem. Thus, for brevity, time notation is suppressed in the above equations.
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Of particular interest in this context is the solution for hunting prey animals . Solving the utility maximisation problem in equations (2a) -(2e), yields the following solutions for the allocation of prey hunting effort in each household:
( )
where 1/ ( 1) (1 )
Substituting (3a) and (3b) in (2d) and aggregating over the N households, gives the total level of hunting:
Observe that since the hunted animals are consumed rather than sold, the price of hunting is determined by the opportunity cost of time, which is defined by the wage rate. Hence, an increase in the wage rate has conflicting income and substitution effects on hunting levels (ie, ∂H x /∂w > (<) 0) and the eventual impact of higher wages depends on the relative parameters of the model. On the other hand, an increase in the price of agricultural goods, unambiguously increases hunting levels (∂H x /∂p g > 0). Intuitively, as agricultural production becomes more profitable, this increases the incentive to protect crops from damage by wild animals. Similarly, as expected, a reduction in the expected fine (θ s Ω s ), or an increase in the level of crop damage (µ), both lead to higher levels of prey poaching (ie, ∂H x /∂(θ s Ω s ) < 0, ∂H x /∂µ > 0).
Having described the factors determining the poaching of tigers and their prey, we now outline a model of tiger biology.
IV. Tiger Biology
The use of a single equation to model population dynamics is often considered inappropriate for large predators that exhibit complex patterns of behaviour and face different mortality rates over various stages in their life cycle (eg, see Burgman et al 1993) . Accordingly, the existing literature describes tiger population dynamics using stage based stochastic models. In this paper, we follow this convention and extend the most recent model of tiger demography by Karanth and Stith (1999) to incorporate predator-prey interactions.
The Karanth-Stith model identifies tigers of both sexes, in four distinct demographic stages: cubs (younger than one year), juveniles (one to two years), transients (tigers older than two years in search of a home range) and adults (breeding tigers with a home range).
In the absence of human pressures, mortality rates at each stage of the life cycle depend on intrinsic survival rates, which incorporate deaths from natural factors such as disease and intraspecific competition. For expositional ease, we begin by describing the dynamics of tiger populations when prey are plentiful and there is no poaching.
The number of cubs that survive in any year is determined by the birth rate of breeding females and the survival rate of cubs: 
where σ as is the survival rate of adults of gender s = m, f. The total population of non-cub tigers is defined to include the sum of juveniles, transients and adults, of both sexes.
The model thus far assumes that prey are plentiful. The only constraints on population growth are the intrinsic survival rates and the amount of territory available to establish home ranges (ie, K s ). If prey depletion lowers tiger-hunting success rates, it will lead to greater mortality. We therefore extend the model to take account of the impact of prey availability on tiger population growth.
Data on the intrinsic growth rates of individual prey species and the effects of browse and forage competition between species in tiger habitats is unavailable. Hence we adopt a simple approach and model the combined biomass of all prey species using a logistic equation of the form:
where X t is the prey biomass at time t, r is the intrinsic growth rate, X is the prey carrying capacity of the forest, H xt is the human harvest of the prey biomass defined in equation (3c) and Ψ t is the harvest of the prey by tigers which is described below.
Field studies suggest that on average a tiger requires approximately 3,000 kg of prey per year to survive (Karanth, 1988) . We therefore define the minimum food intake of a tiger as M = 3,000kg. Field observations also reveal that tigers succeed in capturing between 10 per cent -20 per cent of the available prey biomass in their home ranges (Schaller, 1967; Sunquist, 1981; Johnsingh, 1983) . In the presence of competing predators such as wild dogs (Cuon alpinus) and leopards (Panthera pardus) in these habitats, a predation rate of 10 per cent is deemed more appropriate (Karanth, 1988) ). Thus, the predation rate is defined as ρ = 0.10. It follows that the maximum number of tigers that can be sustained with a prey base of X t is: ρX t /M. Accordingly, the prey biomass consumed by tigers is given by:
where T t is the total number of tigers in period t, M is the minimum food intake and ρ is the predation rate.
Thus, when prey are plentiful (ie, ρX t > MT t ), each tiger is able to meet its nutritional needs and successfully captures M kg of prey per annum, hence Ψ t = MT t . On the other hand, if there is insufficient prey to meet the needs of the total population, the level of predation is at its maximum level Ψ t = ρX t .
A shortage of prey could have two effects on tiger survival prospects. First, prey depletion is likely to depress survival rates across all demographic stages. Second, a
shortage of prey may also lower the carrying capacity of the habitat and thus lead to an expansion in the home ranges of breeding adults. In the absence of data on the effects of prey depletion across demographic groups, we follow Karanth and Stith and assume that prey depletion effects: (i) only the carrying capacity of the habitat and (ii) the survival rates of cubs. Thus, under conditions of prey depletion the survival rates of cubs and the carrying capacity are depressed by a prey depletion factor which is defined as:
It is acknowledged that the neglect of prey depletion effects on the survival rates across other demographic categories is unsatisfactory. This approach can therefore be expected to underestimate the true impact of prey depletion if survival rates are depressed more generally across all demographic stages. However, refinements of the model must await further research on this issue.
Turning next to the effects of poaching. Poachers target juveniles, transients and adults.
The number of tigers killed at each stage is assumed to be proportional to the existing distribution of tigers across the various demographic stages. Thus, define κ 
V. Simulation Results
We now combine the economic models of behaviour (equations (1d) and (3c)) and tiger population growth (equations (4a) - (6c)) to determine the time paths of tiger stocks under alternative scenarios. For given parameters, the level of poaching emerges from the optimising decisions of farmers and poachers. This in turn effects tiger stock levels.
Model parameters are varied to determine the sensitivity of tiger population levels to changes in economic circumstances. The parameters for the basic tiger population model (equations (4a) - (4e)) are from Karanth and Stith (1999) (Karanth and Stith, 1999; Kenney et al, 1995) . In the base case, poachers are assumed to receive Rs 850 for each tiger killed, face a fine of Rs 25,000 and a 1 per cent probability of conviction (WPSI, 2001 , Wildlife Protection Act, India, 1975 .
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Curve A in Figure 1 shows the tiger population trajectory in the absence of tiger poaching and prey depletion. The population achieves a stable equilibrium at 87 adult and juvenile 7 The estimates of prey biomass in prime areas with tiger densities of between 10-12 per 100km 2 is derived from data in Karanth and Nicols (2000) . It is useful to note that this estimate is also consistent with earlier studies conducted using less advanced techniques. For instance Johnsingh (1983) estimates a prey density of 3,382 kg/km 2 in Bandipur reserve and a predation rate of 30 per cent, suggesting a possible carrying capacity of 3,382(1+30 per cent) = 4,397 kg/km 2 .
tigers, suggesting a density of 9 tigers/100 km 2 . This outcome approximates population levels in the fragmented, yet relatively healthy habitats found in India and Nepal. Curve B simulates the effects of tiger poaching when the parameters are at the base case levels.
The population declines to a stable 62 adult and juvenile tigers, with poachers harvesting The simulation presented in Curve D shows the effects of a 20 per cent increase in the price paid to poachers for a tiger body. When the price is increased to Rs 1,020, the population collapses within 50 years. This result is consistent with Karanth and Stith's (1999) simulations and related evidence that hunting of large felids can lead to sudden extinction when it exceeds a certain threshold level (Martin and de Meulanaer, 1988; Bailey, 1993) . More significantly, this finding suggests that a relatively small increase in the payoffs to poaching (from Rs 925 to Rs 1,020) can drive a stable population to extinction in a relatively short time period. The impact of poaching may thus be discontinuous and prone to induce collapses in population. This appears to be an example of the unstable equilibria frequently encountered in discrete time predator-prey models, when the predator population is at low levels (May, 1978 , Freedman, 1979 . On the other hand a 20 per cent decline in agricultural prices (p g = Rs 640) leads to recovery of the population.
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The lower payoff from agricultural production reduces the monetary value of prey-induced crop damage and thus incentives to hunt decline. This result highlights the impact of direct and indirect agricultural subsidies on the environment. More significantly, the responsiveness of prey depletion to agricultural prices, suggests that the withdrawal of agricultural subsidies may generate rapid and substantial improvements in habitat quality. We also considered the effects of a 100 per cent increase in the fine for hunting as well as a 100 per cent increase in the probability of conviction: neither had an impact on tiger populations. Figure 3 presents simulations for the combined effects of a high return to poaching (s= Rs1,020), a moderately higher farm household population of 500, with all other parameters held at base levels. In this case the tiger population becomes extinct within 40 years (Curve A). If the probability of convicting poachers is then increased by 50 per cent, the population lasts another decade, declining to zero in just less than 50 years (Curve B). However, in Curve C the higher return to poaching and increase in the number of farm households are offset when poaching costs increase by 30 per cent (w p = Rs 52).
Curve C displays a tiger population reaching 60 animals within a decade.
We considered numerous other scenarios for the case with high returns to poaching (s= Rs1,020) and a moderately higher farm household population of 500. Notable amongst these were the findings that either a 50 per cent increase in the probability of hunters being convicted or a 50 per cent decline in agricultural prices had no impact on the eventual outcome -both leading to extinction within 40 years.
These results may have important policy implications. When prey depletion lowers growth rates, recovery of the population appears to necessitate controls over the level of poaching. Our results indicate that anti-poaching policies should be directed at increasing the opportunity costs of poaching activities. In practical terms, this might involve more frequent and intensive patrols and other related policies that require greater avoidance by poachers, thus rendering poaching more difficult, which would increase the opportunity costs of poaching. The provision of alternative sources of employment would also increase the opportunity costs of poaching, so long as it does not induce further migration into the area.
This outcome is also suggestive of the reasons why tigers thrive in some prey abundant regions and not in others. In areas where the opportunity cost of poaching is high, due to either effective patrols (eg, Kanha, Bandhavgar, Nagarahole), or difficult terrain (Sunderbans), tigers have survived in reasonable numbers. In more accessible regions, no tigers are to be found, despite the existence of suitable habitats (Wikramanayake et al, 1998) .
VI. Conclusions
This paper extends the existing biological literature on tiger populations by linking a stochastic demographic model of tiger population with household behaviour that endogenises two key threats to tiger populations: poaching tigers and poaching their prey.
Alternative scenarios simulate the impact of the number of households, agricultural income, wage income, and poaching intensity of tigers and their prey. The results highlight the sensitivity, fragility, and instability of tiger populations to these key economic parameters. Most notable is the finding that the level of human population is the most potent threat to the tiger's prey base and that the effects of large population conurbations are difficult to reverse with the economic instruments considered in this paper.
The sensitivity of the tiger population to poaching incentives is a second important concern. Tiger populations appear to exhibit threshold responses to increases in preypoaching intensity. When prey levels are depleted, a relatively small increase in the payoffs to poaching may trigger extinction. Thus, the control of poaching in preydepleted environments remains a matter of critical concern. This result suggests the need for more intensive policing and prosecution. In practice, this may be difficult to achieve, for it would require major institutional and judicial reform accompanied by substantial investment in the judiciary.
The modelling results suggest that an alternative and potentially more effective way to reduce poaching is to increase the opportunity cost of poaching: a relatively small increase in the opportunity cost of poaching is sufficient. Policies such as the provision of alternative employment and off-farm income, accompanied by controls on forest access, would have the desired effect of reducing the incidence of poaching.
The modelling results also raise questions about conservation efforts and forest management strategies that emphasise forest resource use of any kind in and around tiger habitats, including JFM. Alternative rural development strategies are needed that promote off-farm employment, non-forest dependent commercial activities and eliminate private and public infrastructure investments in, around or near tiger habitats. A formidable, yet urgently needed task given that about two-thirds of India's total forest cover is in the tribal districts, and the incidence of poverty among the tribal people is more than 50 percent .
It should be emphasised that these results are tentative, not definitive. Lack of data and information on key economic and biological factors means that the model's parameters are based on imprecise estimates. To guard against exaggerating the threat of extinction we adopted conservative assumptions. For instance, the probability of convicting poachers is assumed to be considerably higher than the available data suggests. Similarly, we use the upper bound of estimates for ungulate intrinsic growth rate and the lower bound of estimates for the returns to agriculture. Moreover, while prey depletion can be expected to effect survival prospects across all age classes, the model conservatively assumes that it has no impact on juvenile or transient tigers, but only depresses cub survival rates and the adult carrying capacity.
Finally it is important to note that this paper ignores a number of other important threats to the tiger. Key amongst these is the unrelenting erosion of habitats and forest corridors connecting tiger reserves. Many tiger reserves are threatened with plans for major development projects including mines, roads and dams (World Bank, 1996) . The reserves face further pressures from the steady extraction of resources for timber, fuelwood, fodder and livestock grazing, all of which are factors closely linked to human population growth. Thus, the effects of habitat erosion remains an area in need of urgent research. There are no studies on, nor is there data available on tiger poaching. We therefore seek to infer poaching production parameters using indirect proxies. One of the more sophisticated methods used to estimate tiger densities relies on a technique known as "camera capture". Cameras are positioned to enclose a given quadrant or transect within which all passing animals are photographed. The calculated population is based on the assumption that the number of tigers photographed depends on the (unknown) density and the level of effort (ie, number of nights the cameras are used). Many of the poaching techniques are "passive" and involve laying a snare or trap in areas where tigers are thought to reside. In the absence of any other information we assume that that the main constraint on poaching is the difficulty involved in finding a tiger. It is supposed that the likelihood of a tiger being caught in a snare or trap is analogous to that of capturing a tiger with a camera in the area being sampled. Thus the probability of poaching is assumed to depend on the density of tigers and the number of days that a trap has been laid. We use information from the camera capture studies to proxy the poaching technology parameters. Using data from 5 available studies in (Nagarahole (Karanth, 1995) , Nagarahole, Pench, Kanha, Kaziranga (Karanth and Nichols, 2000) ), we regress the number of tigers captured by cameras against camera effort and tiger density to obtain the coefficients of the poaching production function: The parameters for poaching effort and density effects are based on these regression estimates. It is acknowledged that these estimates are at best only broadly indicative and likely to be biased. Moreover, it is difficult to determine the direction of the bias. If bait is more (less) efficient at capturing tigers than cameras, we will have underestimated (overestimated) the coefficient on effort and also biased the estimate of density. This is, however, the best available information.
DATA APPENDIX
The parameters used for the probability of detecting and convicting poachers are arbitrary. The Wildlife Trust of India (www. Wildlifetrustofindia.org) has recorded only two convictions for tiger poaching which suggests that the rate of conviction for poaching tigers may be lower than .01 (WPSI 2001) . It is likely that the parameters used in this paper substantially overestimate the true probability of conviction. There is no published data on the conviction rates for poaching prey animals, though it is deemed to be lower than that for tiger poaching (Wildlife Trust of India, pers. comm.).
Off farm wages and the Opportunity Cost of Poaching
Average rural wages in India vary from Rs 40 per day in some states (eg Haryana which has no tiger reserve) to Rs 22 in other states (eg Assam and Madhya Pradesh with tiger populations) (Reserve Bank of India, 1999) ). We take the midpoint of this range and assume that the off-farm wage rate is Rs 30 and that the opportunity cost of poaching may be somewhat higher at Rs 40. This is likely to be an overestimate of the true opportunity cost of poor forest dwellers. 
